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Due to the cultural and linguistic differences, different time zones, and complexities of 
knowledge transfer involved in IT offshoring, offshore-outsourced projects are more prone to 
failure than in-house and domestically outsourced projects. These inherent risks exacerbate the 
communication, coordination and collaboration between vendors and clients and thus affect 
various stages of the offshore outsourced software development (OOSD). Several academic and 
practitioner studies have reported about the failed offshore projects. Although there is no silver 
bullet to overcome the inherent risks, the postmortem examination of failed projects has shown 
that long before the failure there were significant symptoms or early warning signs (EWS) of 
trouble.  An EWS can be defined as an event or indication that predicts or cautions one of 
possible or impending problems in the first 20 % of the project‟s cooperation or collaboration 
period between clients and vendors. These signs become more significant in the unique onshore-
offshore environment, where the risks are higher and there is a need for an early warning 
mechanism that helps to avoid failures. We analyze a failed project case that involved an Indo-
German OOSD contractual arrangement for a web development project in this work. Based on 
explorative, in-depth case study, we identify the EWSs of failure and develop a preliminary 
model to understand the failures. Although this study is based on just one case study, it provided 
exclusive insights from both vendor and client perspectives to study the EWSs from a team 
perspective and to understand the interrelations between the EWS categories.  
 
1. Introduction 
Software development has taken a significant portion of the market share in IT offshoring since 
software coding is an activity that can be dispersed ideally across the globe (Apte and Mason 
1995). Offshore software development is also expected to experience continuous growth in the 
foreseeable future. However, complexity and uncertainty of the nature of software development 
project make it vulnerable to failure (Hoch et al. 2000). Success remains rare for software 
projects as they are difficult to manage even in conditions of co-location and proximity. Due to 
offshore-specific risks such as the cultural and linguistic differences, different time zones, and 
complexities of knowledge transfer involved in IT offshoring (Sahay et al., 2003; Heeks et al., 
2001; Dibbern et al., 2008), offshore-outsourced projects are more prone to failure than in-house 
and domestically outsourced projects (Nakatsu and Iacovou 2009). These inherent risks 
exacerbate the communication, coordination and collaboration between vendors and clients and 
thus affect various stages of the offshore outsourced software development (OOSD). Several 
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academic and practitioner studies have reported about the failed offshore projects. Since 50% of 
the offshore projects reportedly fail to reduce costs because of improper management (Vashistha 
and Vashistha 2006), the original intentions of offshore outsourcing has been questioned.  
Although there is no silver bullet to overcome the inherent risks and thus the poor performance 
of software projects (Brooks 1986), the postmortem examination of failed projects has shown 
that long before the failure there were significant symptoms or early warning signs (EWS) of 
trouble.  We define EWS as an event or indication that predicts or cautions one of possible or 
impending problems in the first 20 % of the project’s cooperation or collaboration period 
between clients and vendors (adapted from Kappelman et al. 2006). Patients with heart trouble 
might list problems such as chest pain, numbness in the left arm as classical symptoms prior to a 
heart attack (Ward, 2003). However, these symptoms may be too late to treat or they may be late 
warning signs. For effective prevention of heart trouble, early symptoms such as high blood 
pressure or high cholesterol levels should be checked (Ward, 2003). As in the above medical 
analogy, the early symptoms or warning signs that are known from the previous IT project 
experiences can be leveraged for better project outcomes. These signs become more significant 
in the unique onshore-offshore environment, where the risks are higher and there is a need for an 
early warning mechanism that helps to avoid failures. The lack of failure research in IS 
outsourcing also calls for research into failed projects.  
The concept of EWSs offers an instrument to reduce the failure rates in offshore projects. The 
concept of project failure is a vague one and few people agree on its exact definition (Pinto and 
Mantel, 1990). IT projects can be judged from the implementation and operations perspective 
and from the project development perspective. This research work has adopted the project 
development perspective to analyze the failure processes before the system gets implemented. 
We define offshore software development project failure as the cancellation of the offshore 
software development project resulting in premature termination of contractual activities 
between clients and vendors before the information system becomes operational. The failure to 
deliver information system can happen at any development phase before the system becomes 
operational. Cancellations of offshore software development projects that have client and vendor 
team members that work at offshore and onshore sites can result from several project internal 
and external factors.  
We explore a real failed project in this research and analyze the EWSs of failures of OOSD 
projects in this exploratory work. We further analyze the issues leading to the EWSs of failures. 
 
2. Related literature 
The concept of EWS in OOSD projects requires knowledge about project management, 
knowledge sharing and cultural differences, which are discussed in this section. It therefore 
builds upon prior research in these areas.  To date, very little effort has been made to combine 
these fields in an interdisciplinary manner to analyze the EWSs. 
2.1 Early Warnings Signs 
The project troubles before the failure are hardly ever detected early enough in the IT industry 
(Havelka and Rajkumar, 2006). Therefore, identifying and managing those troubles at an early 
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stage provide an anticipatory framework (Nikander and Eloranta, 2001) to manage uncertainties 
in the critical early project stages, especially in the onshore-offshore project environment that is 
characterised with higher risks than in domestic project environment. It is known that corrective 
actions in the early project stages are cheaper than the costly recovery measures in the later 
stages (Ewusi-Mensah, 2003; Flowers, 1996) since the rework and retesting of the system will 
increase the project efforts, costs and time and lead to project failures.  
Four major empirical works have studied the concept of EWSs (Kappelman et al., 2006; Havelka 
and Rajkumar, 2006; Nikander and Eloranta, 2001; Philip et al, 2010). Except Nikander and 
Eloranta (2001) who concentrated on industrial construction projects, all other works studied IT 
projects. As opposed to the works that studied EWSs during the whole project life cycle 
(Havelka and Rajkumar, 2006; Nikander and Eloranta, 2001), Kappelman et al.‟s (2006) and 
Philip et al.‟s (2010) work, focussed on the first 20 percent of the project lifecycle.  Research 
about EWSs in offshore-outsourced projects by Philip et al. (2010) has revealed four main 
warning categories - communication, people, formal process and formal output related EWS 
(Philip et al. 2010). The offshore-specific EWSs found by Philip et al. (2010) were all in the 
category of communication. However, all these works were based on surveys that lacked in-
depth analysis of OOSD projects.  
 
Philip et al. (2010) found two main types of EWSs that affect the OOSD projects: offshore-
specific and non-offshore specific EWSs. Offshore-specific EWSs are unique to offshore 
projects and require special attention in OSD projects. These issues result because of the unique 
characteristics of onshore-offshore project environment. Although non-offshore specific EWSs 
are not specific to OOSD projects they are indispensible for the success and require at least as 
much attention for offshore projects as in domestic projects. The presence of these EWSs of 
failures in project-management related areas indicated the relevance of formal control 
mechanisms to offset the disadvantages in terms of cultural differences and geographical 
distances.  
2.2 Knowledge transfer 
The concept of knowledge transfer is difficult to define, because there is no clear distinction 
between the sharing of knowledge and the creation of new knowledge (Bresman et al. 1999). 
Cross-boundary knowledge transfer is further challenged when is occurs virtually. In other 
words, when units are geographically dispersed they are heavily dependent on information and 
communication technology (Gibson et al. 2006).  
Knowledge transfer tasks are classified as either formal (i.e., a planned task) or informal 
(Argote et al. 2000). It is customary to use the term “knowledge transfer” to refer to the sharing 
of knowledge between two distant units of a multinational company, between two different 
functional units at the same location, between a vendor and a client, or even between countries. 
The use of the word sharing implies flow: knowledge „flows‟ from its primary holder to the 
receiver (Doz et al. 1997). In organizations knowledge transfer can be seen as the process 
through which one unit (e.g., team, group, department) is affected by the experience of another 
(Argote et al. 2000). 
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Knowledge transfer refers to the exchange of either expertise or external market information of 
global relevance but not to the transfer of internal administrative information (Gupta et al. 1991). 
In other words, knowledge transfer refers to the exchange of operational knowledge. This can be 
in the form of data, blueprints, parts, machines, or other means such as direct person-to-person 
communication (Doz et al. 1997).  
Knowledge transfers are strategically important to organizations for several reasons. They 
transmit localized know-how from one sub-unit to other units in the organization. Knowledge 
transfers also facilitate the co-ordination of workflows linking multiple, geographically dispersed 
sub-units. Furthermore they can enable organizations to capitalise on business opportunities 
requiring the collaboration of several sub-units.  
Offshore outsourcing situations present various challenges to companies with regard to 
knowledge transfer. Partners should be motivated to access and produce knowledge within the 
project, which means that relevant project knowledge has to be made accessible to those project 
members that need it. To do so, communication needs to be established between those who need 
and those who possess knowledge. To achieve this goal the company has to choose the best 
instruments of control, motivation and context (Balaji et al. 2005). 
Successfully identifying, analysing, specifying, and documenting project-relevant knowledge is 
crucial; for offshore software development, it becomes even higher priority in terms of its 
effectual transfer across boundaries. Differences in location-specific work cultures like work 
ethic, importance of hierarchy, and mode of communication can impact the transfer of project 
relevant knowledge.  
Knowledge can be split into explicit (codified and easy to transfer) and tacit knowledge. Tacit 
knowledge is difficult to articulate and is more challenging to transfer than explicit knowledge 
(Nonaka 1994). Similarly, knowledge that has not been codified is more difficult to transfer than 
codified knowledge (Zander et al. 1995).  
Another aspect of knowledge is its “embeddedness”. According to McGrath and Argote‟s 
framework, knowledge is embedded in three basic elements – members, tools, and tasks – and 
the various sub-networks formed by combining or crossing the basic elements. Members are the 
human components of organizations. Tools, including both hardware and software, are the 
technological component. Tasks reflect the organization‟s goals, intentions, and purposes 
(Argote et al. 2003; McGrath et al. 2001). Szulanski analyzed how characteristics of the source 
of knowledge, the recipient, the context, and the knowledge itself affected transfer (Szulanski 
2000). Knowledge transfer must take into account embedded information especially during 
offshore software development (Nicholson et al. 2004).  
Furthermore it is important to note that the quality and performance of embedded knowledge 
transfer is highly dependent on the level of trust and the quality of the relationship between the 
source and recipient (Griffith et al. 2003; Szulanski 1996). If the recipient doesn‟t trust the 
source, the knowledge acquisition will be questionable and if the source doesn‟t have a good 
relationship with the recipient the willingness to transfer background information and tacit 
knowledge will be troublesome. 
Conveying project relevant knowledge to counterparts working in a geographically distant, 
culturally distant country can be a difficult task and is important to focus on.  
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2.3 Cultural distance 
Culture plays an important role in any team activity‟s success and is associated with the 
knowledge sharing process and common understanding between team members. Understanding 
and dealing with cultural differences for the efficient transfer of project related knowledge is one 
of the motivations for our research. Furthermore, cultural compatibility is often described as an 
important factor in determining the success of international software development teams 
(Gallivan et al. 2005). A number of researchers have already investigated cross-cultural offshore 
projects (Gallivan et al. 2005; Krishna et al. 2004; Walsham 2002) and they suggest that the 
cultural approach in IT research needs to take a broader view on culture. Culture is a difficult 
topic to discuss and a limitation of cross-cultural work is that culture is constantly changing.  
According to Hofstede (1980), "Culture is more often a source of conflict than of synergy. 
Cultural differences are a nuisance at best and often a disaster". Dealing with cultural difference 
in a project can be troublesome, but it shouldn‟t be considered as just a single influencing 
variable but rather as a set of variables that influence the project on multiple levels. This 
approach to understanding culture sees many different layers, including national, organizational, 
professional groups, and individuals. These are seen as being intertwined in a complex, non-
hierarchical way (Gallivan et al. 2005; Karahanna et al. 2005).  
This approach may be convenient for conceptualization, but it is very limited for practical 
purposes in the modern international business world. Hofstede furthermore points out that 
geographical separation and cultural differences can lead to quasi-autonomous sub-organizations 
which may lead to further problems of communication, co-ordination, control and motivation 
(Hofstede 1984b). Thus cultural differences within organizations should not be ignored when 
discussing knowledge transfer and can be regarded as one of the barriers between company 
divisions and local units. Knowledge transfer between project partners located in the same 
country can be troublesome enough, but it is clear that this problem becomes much more severe 
with geographical and cultural distance (Boden et al. 2009; Bresman et al. 1999).  
Within knowledge sharing relationships between members of differing cultures, participants 
communicated less information than between members of the same cultural background. Li 
shows that communication between individuals in high-context countries and low-context 
countries differs significantly in the amount of information transferred (Li 1999). These 
differences in communication between high-context and low-context cultures lead to tremendous 
losses of relevant knowledge within the transfer process between these groups. 
Contact and communication between different cultures is an inherent fact of offshoring, thus 
research on cross-cultural issues in this area is gaining more and more emphasis. Motivated by 
the immense potential negative influence of cross-cultural issues on performance as well as 
relationship building in software development projects (Carmel et al. 2005), even IS research is 
beginning to focus on culture. The common understanding of culture is that it is learned, 
associated with values and behaviours, shared by a group, and passed from one generation to the 
next (MacGregor et al. 2005).  
To explain cultural differences, researchers make use of dimensions of national cultural 
variations. These dimensions are the specific aspects of a culture that can be measured in relation 
to other cultures (Hofstede et al. 2004). Hofstede provides an overview of the most popular 
cultural dimensions: power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, 
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masculinity/femininity, and long/short term orientation. Referring to these dimensions helps to 
understand and explain why people from different cultures might behave and think differently. 
For the study of offshore software development, these dimensions can be a useful metric for 
understanding problems before they arise and analyzing why knowledge sharing can be so 
complicated between team members from different cultures. 
Hofstede‟s work on culture has, however, been the subject of some criticism. According to 
McSweeney, he sees culture as a stable, monolithic concept; cultural groups are seen as 
homogeneous, ignoring the possibility of subcultures; and actors only interact in one culture at a 
time (McSweeney 2002). Although these points might have some validity, other scholars argue 
that managers and groups tend to identify strongly with their national values and thus this 
important source of culture cannot be ignored (Sahay et al. 2003). 
We understand the criticism of Hofstede‟s work, but we find that he provides a useful framework 
for comparing cultures with each other. Whether or not his specific indices are applicable to 
reality is debateable and not within the scope of this paper.  
3. Research Framework and Methodology 
We have applied an exploratory case study research (Yin 2002) to analyze the EWSs of failures 
in OOSD project. Based on the literature review, we have developed a research framework 
(figure 1) that guided our analysis. The EWSs in OOSD projects appear as a combination of 
offshore-specific and offshore-indispensible (non-offshore specific) warning signs. They can be 
broadly divided into four categories: communication, culture (offshore-specific), knowledge 
transfer and project management (offshore-indispensible). The issues within a category might be 
linked as the literature review has shown. We will further explore the interrelations among all 
categories in this case study. The offshore-specific EWSs that are unique to OOSD projects 
result because of the unique characteristics of onshore-offshore project environment. The 
offshore-indispensible ones play a big role as well since the characteristics of OOSD projects 
require more formal and structured processes to manage the project management and knowledge 
transfer process than in domestic projects. 
 
Figure 1: Research framework to study OOSD EWSs 
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Our research framework provides a mental framework for analyzing offshore project failures and 
EWSs. We applied this framework to a case study and examined the connections between the 
issues in the different categories. 
Since there is a lack of qualitative field studies about OOSD project failures, we chose case study 
as our research methodology. This allows us to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context where the relevant behavior cannot be manipulated (Yin 2002). We 
formulated the following research questions as the core of our research: 
Which are the early warning signs that contribute to OOSD project failure? How are these 
warning signs interrelated? 
Selecting the case was important, because we needed to get full access to a project on-site and 
off-site with the possibility of collecting as much data as necessary up to the level of “theoretical 
saturation” (Eisenhardt 1989). The case we selected offered an exclusive insight into an OOSD 
project in the Indo-German project environment. 
The research was exploratory in nature and relied on an interpretive in-depth case study 
(Saunders et al. 2006; Yin 2002). The collection of data included interviews as primary sources 
and secondary information from email and instant messenger log files, which included 
documents and questionnaires regarding software development which we correlated (Yin 2002).  
The interviews and data collection were conducted primarily in a first round between June and 
August 2008. The interviews lasted 45 to 90 minutes and involved both the client (4 
interviewees) and the vendor (7 interviewees). The interviews were semi-structured to allow 
flexibility and to ensure that the researchers captured any interesting phenomena (Saunders et al. 
2006). The interviews were conducted with senior management, project managers, and 
developers of each company together with a review of project documentation, emails, IM logs 
and formal presentation material. During this round of interviews we were able to visit the 
vendor in India and conducted the interviews with managers and developers onsite. This visit 
brought an additional insight to the research material, because we were able to observe and talk 
to the developers in real-life conditions. 
 
Additionally, we conducted a second round of interviews during November 2008 when we 
realized from our analysis that we needed additional data and more focus on the identified 
concepts and categories. During the second round we visited the UK for more focused interviews 
with the managers to discuss the themes and categories from the first round of analysis. In total 
the data gathered from client and vendor includes approximately 40 hours of interviews, most of 
which was transcribed. The transcripts, together with the field notes and secondary data built a 
rich basis for this research project.  
In the tradition of explorative research, our goal was not to test theoretical propositions, but to 
develop a theoretical contribution (Eisenhardt 1989).  
In the first phase of analysis we sorted the interviews, personal notes, and secondary data from 
the first round of interviews to write contact summary sheets and a chronology of the project. 
With the help of the summary sheets we classified and coded interviews and the secondary 
material (e.g. documents, emails and IM logs). After coding the material we analyzed the codes 
and tried to built themes and categories upon it. After completion the first round of analysis, we 
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entered a sequence of analysis cycles where we analyzed the data (field notes, coding, displaying 
data, conclusions) and searched for extended literature from related fields for relevant concepts 
and categories. As a result of the analysis process four EWS categories and their relationships 
become apparent: communication, culture, knowledge transfer and project management. Based 
on these categories we narrowed our interview guideline for the second round of interviews.  
4. Case description 
The project took place in late 2007 and consisted of a German software company (client) that 
contracted a web development project to a service provider (vendor) situated in Bangalore, 
India. The client had decided to explore the possibilities of outsourcing, and so chose the 
extension of an existing proprietary software system as a pilot project with a new vendor. This 
was the client‟s first attempt at outsourcing. The goal was to develop a new sub-module adding 
more flexibility to an existing content management system (CMS). The vendor saw it as a good 
opportunity to establish a potential long-term relationship via a smaller scope project. 
Before the project started, the client manager and project manager traveled to the UK to meet 
with the vendor‟s key account manager. During the meeting, the client and vendor established 
the scope and the client agreed to send source code to the client so that they could submit a bid 
on the project. The vendor was not previously familiar with the software system. 
The client project manager (CPM) emailed the source code to the vendor project manager 
(VPM) in Bangalore, and exchanged a few emails discussing the preferred composition of the 
vendor team by looking through developer CVs. After the team was selected, the client 
developer (CD) assisted the vendor developers (VDs) with installing the system. After the 
system was installed, the CD and VDs took part in an informal training session about basic usage 
of the system, during which the VDs asked questions which were answered by the CD. 
Two weeks later, the VPM provided the CPM with an analysis of the existing system. The 
vendor then responded with a fixed-price bid for the project and a timeline of three months. 
There were no clarification questions submitted by the vendor at this point. Both parties agreed 
that the CD would support the VDs when they had any questions. 
The vendor also set up a project management tool accessible by the client. This allowed the 
client to see the status of the project and handle issues, and was designed to speed up the flow of 
information especially during the delivery phase. The VD‟s manger described the advantages of 
such a tool as follows: 
“To facilitate the time and distance challenges of the project, we will set-up a Project 
Management Office (PMO), which will provide delivery oversight for the project engagement. 
The PMO provides specialized services in project start up, project management, project 
control and tracking, project audit, software quality assurance and offshore/onsite 
coordination to ensure successful technical delivery of projects.” 
During the first two months of development, the CD received a few clarification questions from 
the VDs, but there was otherwise little communication in either direction. At about the two-
month point, the vendor provided a login to the client to their internal system, and the client was 
able to check the process of the sub-module. To the client‟s dismay, the module was barely 
functional and they began to have serious doubts about the success of the project. Due to the 
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results of the client testing, the vendor decided to push back the final release of the project to an 
undetermined date, despite the client‟s desire to know a specific timeframe. 
During this phase, lasting around three extra months, the VDs had a large number of questions 
that they submitted directly to the CD. The vendor prepared a second release, which was 
likewise unacceptably nonfunctional and had developed further technical problems. 
After the second release, the CPM began to apply increasing pressure on the VPM, expressing 
serious concerns about the ability of the vendor to finish the project at all. The vendor then 
extended the deadline once more. After an additional three months, the vendor general manager 
stepped in and signaled their inability to finish and both parties agreed to cancel the project. 
5. Case Analysis 
We found the major offshore-specific and offshore-indispensible EWSs prior to the failure of the 
analyzed case. The results are discussed in this section. Based on this analysis, we develop a 
preliminary model to understand the linkages between the issues that appear as EWSs of failure.    
 
5.1 Offshore-specific EWS 
 
The communication processes within the project were not clearly specified in the beginning. 
Both the client and vendor agreed to keep in touch through the instant messenger skype. The 
development works were agreed to be delivered according to the specifications of CMMI Level 
5. Although the development took place according to the specifications, the communication 
processes were not transparent to the client. The client was not invited to the project meetings of 
the vendor. No information about meetings or discussions on the client site was conveyed to the 
vendor and the vendor got the impression of a long communication break. The project had a 
common development platform; however, it was not for the client whether the vendor was 
working on the project. Only after the poor results of the first deliverables did the both sides 
agree to communicate more openly.  
 
The use of an instant messenger as the primary communication medium has allowed the teams to 
communicate across time-zones. However, the lack of effective project management of both 
teams by disseminating the correct information between the teams led to a communication gap, 
which was closed late for the project to be finished according to the specifications. 
 
The two project partners were culturally diverse in many important aspects. The client team had 
a very flat hierarchy and was composed of highly individualistic members. The vendor team, on 
the other hand, had a very rigid structure and was made up of team members that were not 
allowed to make decisions without consulting several layers of hierarchy. The client team was 
extremely focused on receiving direct yes or no answers, while the vendor team usually tried to 
present a positive impression by including a lot of background information that was perceived as 
unnecessary by the client. Using the Hall framework, we would classify the client team as low-
context and the vendor team as high-context. The other differences correspond closely to the 
Hofstede dimensions of power distance and individualism vs. collectivism. 
An interesting observation is that across the culturally diverse teams there was a sub-group that 
appeared to share a common culture. When the developers from both client and vendor teams 
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were allowed to communicate directly, they appeared to share enough common practices and 
knowledge that their cultural values played a smaller role and they were able to communicate 
quickly and effectively. On the other hand, the project managers, despite sharing some common 
practices, did not appear to communicate any more or less effectively. The assumption is that the 
project managers are more affected by cultural values whereas the developers more by their 
practices. 
The differences between the two teams were not initially apparent during the explicit knowledge 
transfer phase. In fact, the differences played virtually no role during the initial phase. The 
vendor had a very explicit quality assurance process for transferring documentation and 
requirements, which was followed without any problems. 
Identified EWS: Lack of transparency and openness in communication 
 
The VDs have apparently not understood all the configuration details of the CMS and they did 
not enquire about the details from the client. In the first phase, the CMS was introduced to the 
vendor through a videoconference and the installation took place together with the vendor and 
client teams. The VDs have acknowledged that they understood the system well; however, it was 
found later that some of the basic principles were not understood well. The VDs did not want to 
ask “silly” questions and pester the client. Until the delivery of the first milestone, there were 
practically no questions and the client assumed that everything was fine. The client project 
manager has commented the following: “I was wondering why they never contacted me on 
critical issues although I had the feeling that something was going wrong. I then changed my 
tactic to ask them directly on the status whereas I always found out somehow what went wrong.” 
 
The lack of questions from the vendor resulted mainly because of the differences in cultural 
attitudes. As opposed to the German side, the Indians did not want to give a wrong impression by 
asking wrong questions and thus did not communicate openly. One of the vendor developer also 
noticed that very few questions were asked, although he himself understood and assumed that the 
other developers have understood the functionalities of the system. The German side noticed the 
results only after the first deliverables arrived, which has already put the project in the wrong 
track. 
 
Identified EWS: Lack of questions in the requirements phase 
 
5.2 Non-offshore specific EWS 
 
 
The CMS code was transferred to the vendor by the client after the kick-off. However, because 
of the lack of clear business specifications, the VDs could not analyze the code correctly and 
implement it. Further, the specifications appeared ambiguous for the vendor at some points and 
this has affected the delivery of the system. No project management measures were put in place 
to analyze the requirements and impart them to the VDs at the right time. This was noticed only 
once the first version of the CMS implementation was tested.  
 
Identified EWS: Unclear and ambiguous business specifications  
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As a result of inadequate analysis in the requirements phase the requirements became clearer 
only during the course of the project. The vendor could not analyze the requirements and 
compare them with the available functionalities of the CMS since it was the first project of the 
vendor with the particular system. The vendor at some point even had confusion about the 
acronyms CMS and CRM (Customer Relationship Management). The vendor has focused on the 
technical requirements and has not reconciled with the available functionalities of the CMT.   
 
Identified EWS: Misunderstanding of requirements  
 
 
The vendor company was acquainted with the CMS. The CVs of the developers have also shown 
the experience of the VDs with the CMS. However, not all VDs in the projects were expert 
system implementers and the senior developer, who was supposed to take part in the project, was 
not included in the team. The technical skills of the employed developers were not adequate to 
implement the product correctly. This has resulted in unsatisfactory implementation of the CMS 
and it was only noticed after the delivery in the first milestone. The VDs have admitted later that 
they have underestimated the complexity of the project and lacked the experiences to implement 
the system as required.  
The client project manager has remarked the following about the competency of the vendor: ” 
…after several days on his part trying to solve a particular problem the vendor developer 
declared a certain task impossible when I knew it would be quite easy to accomplish. Using a 
web browser and typing the three keywords into Google gave the correct solution ranking first. 
So I sent him the article I found and an example of how to accomplish that particular task. I did 
not get an answer to that email but the next email merely stated the problem had been 
addressed…”.  
The competency to transfer the technical skills in the project also seems to be overlooked in 
OOSD projects. We have found that although the vendors appear competent to implement the 
project, they might lack the right personnel to apply the skills in the offshore environment. 
Although the VDs have acquired the skills necessary to fulfil the tasks, they lacked the 
competency to convert the skills into deliverables. The terms "skills" and "competencies" are 
often used interchangeably in the literature, but they are not necessarily synonymous.  
Skills can be understood as the ability to perform a task that is acquired from one's knowledge 
and practice, whereas competency can be considered as any underlying characteristic required 
for performing a given task, activity, or role successfully. Competency may take the following 
forms: knowledge, attitude, skill and other characteristics of an individual including motives, 
values, self concept etc.  
 
Identified EWS: Lack of required technical skills and competencies 
 
6. Preliminary Model and Conclusions 
We have analyzed a failed project case in offshore outsourced software development (OOSD) 
and gained insights about the early warning signs (EWS) before the failure. This case analysis 
provided exclusive insights as we had access to failure data from both client and vendor 
perspectives to analyze the case from the team perspective.  
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We believe that our contribution from this study is to show the direct connection between several 
related fields and to present a distinct mental model for analyzing this connection. Figure 2 
depicts a preliminary model that provides insights into the EWSs of failures in OOSD project 
and their interrelations.  
 
Figure 2: Preliminary model of the relation among EWSs  
 
 
The EWSs in OOSD projects appear as a combination of offshore-specific and offshore-
indispensible EWSs. The presence of non-offshore specific EWSs or offshore-indispensible 
EWSs suggests the necessity of more formal and structured processes to avoid project failures in 
OOSD projects. The failure analysis has found that the issues related with culture form the basis 
of many problems. They further affect the communication process and thus the knowledge 
transfer. Knowledge transfer was found be important to explain the offshore-indispensible EWSs 
as well. This chain of issues that show up as EWSs leading to failures was a new finding found 
from the case study analysis. The understanding of the event chains is relevant as it will help to 
give enough emphasis to particular risks based on their weightage and occurrence in OOSD 
projects. The project management processes were found to have affected the knowledge transfer 
process. Efficient knowledge sharing and transfer process was found to be highly relevant for the 
successful completion of OOSD projects. 
 
Although this model is based on one case study, which is a weakness of this work, we have 
combined different research fields in an OOSD project to produce a preliminary model. In the 
next step, we will further analyze the case deeply for more EWSs and then triangulate with the 
existing theories in IS research to reflect on our findings and also search for new phenomena. 
The linkages between issues have to be formulated explicitly with propositions and a full-fledged 
theory about the EWSs will be developed.  This substantive theory will help to explain linkage of 
the EWSs that show up prior to failure and the OSD project failures. 
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